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INTRODUCTION

A. The Question of Postpartum Psychosis
In 1987, Sheryl Massip killed her six-week-old son. She first
threw him into oncoming traffic, then hit him on the head, and
1
finally ran him over with her own car. Prior to these actions,
Massip had suffered from hallucinations, severe depression, and
2
thoughts about suicide. She initially claimed that the child had
3
been kidnapped, but later admitted to killing him. Although a
4
California jury found her guilty of second-degree murder, the
judge presiding over the case overturned the verdict two months
5
later and entered an acquittal on insanity grounds. He required
Massip to undergo at least one year of outpatient therapy to treat
6
the postpartum psychosis, even though her symptoms had
disappeared given the span of time between the death of her son
7
and the trial. On the prosecution’s appeal, the appellate court
upheld the judge’s finding of insanity on the basis of postpartum
8
psychosis.
In 2001, Andrea Yates drowned her five children six months
9
after the birth of her youngest child. Yates had suffered from a
10
history of postpartum illness, beginning with voices she heard
soon after the birth of her first child telling her to stab her
11
newborn child. Her severe postpartum depression after the birth
of her fourth child in 1999 led to two suicide attempts and
12
subsequent hospitalization. After the birth of her fifth child, she
1. Eric Lichtblau, Appeal Argued in Postpartum Psychosis Case, L.A. TIMES, May
24, 1990, at B1.
2. People v. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868, 869 (Ct. App. 1990).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR
CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE “PROM
MOM” 12 (2001). See Section II.B below for a discussion of the defining
characteristics of postpartum psychosis.
8. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
9. Margaret G. Spinelli, Introduction to INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL xvi-xvii (Margaret G. Spinelli, ed., 2003).
10. Id. at xvii.
11. Id.
12. Anne Belli Gesalman, Signs of a Family Feud, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 2002, at
41.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/9

2

March: The Conflicted Treatment of Postpartum Psychosis under Criminal L
7MARCH_PAGINATED.DOC

2005]

11/17/2005 9:55:01 AM

POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS

245

became almost catatonic and was hospitalized again but
13
14
discharged. Her physician discontinued her antipsychotic doses.
Two weeks later, Yates committed the drownings and then called
15
both her husband and the police.
Although Yates raised an
insanity defense based on a postpartum psychosis diagnosis, a
Texas jury found her guilty of five counts of murder, ultimately
16
rejecting the death penalty in favor of a life sentence.
B. The Questions Postpartum Psychosis Raises
The women in these cases, the mental illness afflicting them,
and the differing court and jury treatments they received raise a
number of questions concerning how society and the law approach
postpartum illness, particularly postpartum psychosis.
One
question is how to identify the causes of, define, and delimit the
17
boundaries of postpartum illnesses and postpartum psychosis.
Another question is how the biological basis of postpartum
psychosis implicates ideas of feminism, motherhood, and gender
18
equity. The nature of postpartum psychosis also raises significant
questions about the present standards of the cognitive test applied
to the insanity defense in most states, and whether those existing
legal frameworks adequately capture postpartum psychosis or
whether they create a gap through which women suffering from
19
postpartum illness fall.
C. Potential Solutions to the Criminal Treatment of Postpartum Psychosis
This article will address these questions and explore a variety
of solutions to the problem of addressing postpartum psychosis.
20
One solution is to maintain the status quo system. This “solution”
determines that defendants suffering from postpartum psychosis
who meet the high bar of the cognitive test for successfully raising
an insanity defense are properly excluded from punishment, but
13. Spinelli, supra note 9, at xvii.
14. Id.
15. Cheryl L. Meyer & Margaret G. Spinelli, Medical and Legal Dilemmas of
PostPartum Psychiatric Disorders, in INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 9, at 176.
16. Spinelli, supra note 9, at xvii.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.A.
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those who do not meet the test are properly located within the
existing criminal justice system. An alternative approach is to
implement statutory provisions such as those enacted in the United
Kingdom and many European countries, which provide for lesser
charges or sentencing for crimes committed by women within a
21
certain time period after the birth of a child. Another option is to
implement a different version of the insanity test for postpartum
psychosis based on the unique characteristics of the illness and the
22
limited pool of individuals who can have this mental illness. The
last option this article discusses is to keep postpartum psychosis
cases within the criminal system, but to either reduce the criminal
sentence or remove the sentencing phase to the mental health
treatment system rather than working within the present system of
23
incarceration.
II. IDENTIFYING AND DEFINING POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS
A. A Brief History of Postpartum Illness
Diagnoses of postpartum illness stem from as far back as
Hippocrates in the fourth century, B.C., who noted in one woman
recently delivered of twins a “severe case of insomnia and
24
restlessness that began on the sixth day” after the birth.
Postpartum illness falls along a spectrum researchers have divided
into three different categories: postpartum blues, postpartum
25
depression, and postpartum psychosis.
B. Types of Postpartum Illness
26

Postpartum blues, otherwise known as “baby blues” or
27
affects between an estimated twenty-five to
“maternity blues,”
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part V.D.
See SHARON L. ROAN, POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION: EVERY WOMAN’S GUIDE TO
DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT & PREVENTION 24 (1997).
25. Velma Dobson & Bruce Sales, The Science of Infanticide and Mental Illness, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1098, 1104 (2000).
26. Michael O’Hara, Post-partum “Blues,” Depression, and Psychosis: A Review, 7 J.
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 205, 206 (1987).
27. Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity
Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
1, 14-15 (2003).
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eighty-five percent of women during the first six to eight weeks
28
Because this condition occurs so
after they deliver a child.
commonly, physicians, psychiatrists, and laypeople alike consider it
29
a “normal” part of the childbirth process. Its impact is largely
30
“trivial” and “fleeting,” involving a range of minor presentations
of irritability, diminished appetite, mood swings, crying jags,
31
anxiety, disorientation, and fatigue, usually beginning the first few
32
days after childbirth and rarely continuing past two weeks.
Postpartum blues do not impair a woman’s sense of judgment, and,
as mentioned, are considered a normal element of the childbirth
33
process and not a mental disorder or a disease.
Postpartum depression affects between an estimated five to
34
twenty percent of new mothers.
Postpartum depression is
considered to be a “clinical depression occurring during the weeks
35
and months following childbirth.” It usually appears within the
36
It presents symptoms
first six months following childbirth.
including disinterest, sleep problems, fatigue, decision-making
difficulties, guilt, thoughts of suicide, feelings of inadequacy and
37
hopelessness, and lack of love for the new child.
Postpartum psychosis occurs much more rarely—one or two of
38
every thousand new mothers, or approximately 0.2% of new
mothers, will have episodes of psychosis in which they experience
delusions or hallucinations, severe depression, disordered thought

28. Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1104. The range of women postpartum
blues affects varies widely from study to study. One study places the range at fifty
to eighty percent. Anne Damante Brusca, Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out for
Murderous Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1990). Another lists the range
at fifty percent. Brice Pitt, Maternity Blues, 122 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 431, 433 (1973).
29. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1141.
30. Id.
31. Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1104; Jessie Manchester, Beyond
Accommodation: Reconstructing the Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for
Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 719 (2003).
32. Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1104; Manchester, supra note 31, at 719.
33. O’Hara, supra note 26, at 207-09.
34. Some sources estimate ten to fifteen percent of new mothers develop
postpartum depression. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1143; O’Hara, supra note 26, at
210. Another study estimates between five and twenty percent. Dobson & Sales,
supra note 25, at 1105.
35. Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1105.
36. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 7, at 77.
37. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1143; Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1105;
O’Hara, supra note 26, at 217.
38. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 7, at 12.
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39

processes, and deviant behavior.
Some disordered thought
processes expressed by mothers suffering from postpartum
psychosis include seeing a room upside down, fearing conspiracies
to kill her child, and obsessive thoughts about ways in which to
40
harm the child herself.
Postpartum psychosis typically arises
within the first two weeks after childbirth, and it generally requires
41
hospitalization and aggressive medical treatment.
C. Postpartum Psychosis as a Mental Disorder
Postpartum psychosis is not categorized in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders–Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) as
42
its own diagnosis. Instead, it is included within the general “mood
43
disorders” category, and is not considered, within the DSM-IV, to
44
be distinguishable from non-postpartum psychoses, although the
45
DSM-IV does refer to a “postpartum onset specifier.” The DSM-IV
states that the symptoms of postpartum depression do “not differ
from the symptomatology in nonpostpartum mood episodes and
46
may include psychotic features.”
As an affective disorder,
postpartum psychosis is cyclical and can reoccur with subsequent
47
pregnancies.
An estimated one in seven to one in four
subsequent pregnancies can spark another postpartum psychotic
48
episode. The fact that postpartum psychosis does not appear in
the DSM-IV as a separate condition is problematic because it does
49
not separate the psychosis from other psychotic disorders.
39. KATHARINA DALTON, DEPRESSION AFTER CHILDBIRTH 84-90 (3rd ed. 1996);
MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 7, at 12; Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1106.
40. Michele Connell, The Postpartum Psychosis Defense and Feminism: More or Less
Justice for Women?, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 146 (2002) (summarizing patient
stories in DALTON, supra note 39).
41. DALTON, supra note 39, at 85; Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1106-22.
42. Connell, supra note 40, at 146.
43. Manchester, supra note 31, at 722.
44. O’Hara, supra note 26, at 217.
45. Manchester, supra note 31, at 722.
46. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 386 (4th ed. 1998).
47. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1145.
48. Id. at 1146.
49. One commentator suggests that this failure to categorize postpartum
psychosis as a separate disorder reflects how “male-centered models” of medicine,
law, and language marginalize women suffering from postpartum disorders and
fail to recognize the medical attention they require. Laura E. Reece, Comment,
Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and Criminal Infanticide, 38 UCLA L. REV. 699,
710-11 (1991).
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D. The Uncertain Cause(s) of Postpartum Psychosis
One problem is that the exact cause of postpartum illness,
including postpartum psychosis, has not yet been determined, and
50
medical experts do not agree on its possible causes. Hippocrates
51
attributed it to an “excessive blood flow to the brain.” At the time
of the Infanticide Act of 1938 in the United Kingdom, physicians
52
explained the disorder as the effect of lactation creating hormonal
53
aftereffects to the labor and delivery process. Other studies have
pointed to the endocrinal changes in the body following pregnancy
54
and childbirth, the levels of progesterone, estradiol, and estrogen
55
56
in the body, or the changes in tryptophan metabolism, but these
57
results have been inconclusive.
An additional complication for postpartum psychosis is the
role external aggravating factors can have. Some studies have
shown that, for instance, “the level of support that the mother
receives from the father and family” during the months following
the birth of a child is “more determinative” of postpartum
58
depression than other demographic or biological factors. One
study has noted that mothers suffering from postpartum psychosis
59
generally fit the mold of “devoted mothers,” but an obsession with
being a “good mother” causes insecurity about “who they are and
their parenting ability” that becomes a severe delusion and slips
60
into a psychosis.
Another study has found that “prepregnancy
stressors such as unplanned pregnancy, marital discord, poor
identity with the mother, prenatal anxiety, and emotional
problems” may be contributing factors, but “do not by themselves

50. Connell, supra note 40, at 148.
51. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 15, at 168.
52. Katherine O’Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REV.
259, 261 (1984).
53. Id. at 262.
54. DALTON, supra note 39, at 68.
55. J.B. Murray & L. Gallahue, Postpartum Depression, 113 GENETIC SOC. & GEN.
PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 193, 203 (1987).
56. Reece, supra note 49, at 713.
57. Steven Lee, Postpartum Emotional Disorders, 1984 MED. TRIAL TECH. 286, 291
(1984).
58. O’Hara, supra note 26, at 214.
59. Susan Ayres, “[N]ot a Story to Pass On”: Constructing Mothers Who Kill, 15
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 107 (2004) (quoting interview with Cheryl Meyer from
60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Dec. 9, 2001)).
60. Id.
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61

account for the etiology of postpartum mental disorders.”
It
remains unclear, however, whether social support structures can
actually prevent postpartum mental illness, or whether such
structures “simply protect[] mothers and their children against the
62
potential threat posed by such illnesses.” Postpartum psychosis is
63
also “quite difficult to treat.”
III. SITUATING POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF
CONCEPTS OF MOTHERHOOD AND FEMINIST THEORY
A. Perceptions of Motherhood—Good, Bad, and Mad
Historically, women, at least in European and American
society, have been defined along one of two binaries—either as the
64
“temptress” figure, or as a pure mother figure —the Eve and the
Madonna. The mother figure encompasses a certain set of
65
attributes—namely self-sacrifice, compassion, and caring —that
define her as a “good mother” and, synonymously, a “good
66
woman.”
Such treatment of women suffering from postpartum
psychosis—or even women who commit infanticide for other
reasons—continues today. Often, the media—and the jury—judge
a woman who has killed her child or children while suffering from
postpartum psychosis along preconceived ideas of “good” or “bad”
womanhood. One commentator has posited that the killing of
one’s child is an extreme social transgression because an
“infanticidal mother directly challenges male authority, and the
67
male-dominant family structure.”
Such a challenge requires a

61. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1146-47. See also John J. Harding, Postpartum
Psychiatric Disorders: A Review, 30 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHOL. 109, 109-12 (1989);
Valerie Thurtle, Post-natal Depression: The Relevance of Sociological Approaches, 22 J.
ADVANCED NURSING 416, 416-24 (1995).
62. Michelle Oberman, “Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet”: Tragedies at the
Intersection of Motherhood, Mental Illness and the Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
33, 35 (2003).
63. Id. at 40.
64. LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER, ENDANGERED CHILDREN:
NEONATICIDE, INFANTICIDE, AND FILICIDE 3 (2000); Sandy Meng Shan Liu,
Postpartum Psychosis: A Legitimate Defense for Negating Criminal Responsibility?, 4
SCHOLAR 339, 377 (2002).
65. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 64, at 3; Liu, supra note 64, at 377.
66. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 64, at 3; Liu, supra note 64, at 377.
67. Karen Lewicki, Can You Forgive Her?: Legal Ambivalence Toward Infanticide, 8
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mother to be defined in a binary way—either mad or bad.
Women who generally conform to stereotypical gender norms but
who commit the crime of killing their children are seen as “mad,”
whereas women who do not conform to such norms and kill their
69
children are seen as “bad.” A mother society views (or the press
depicts) as bad generally receives a more severe sentence than does
70
a mother society views as mad in this context.
During the Yates trial, for instance, the press focused heavily
on how Yates had been an “ideal” wife and mother prior to the
murders. She was a housewife who was caring for and homeschooling her five children. She was also caring for her father, who
was afflicted with Alzheimer’s. In a 60 Minutes interview, her
husband noted that “she’s a terrific mother that loved the
children,” and commentator Ed Bradley noted that the Yateses
71
looked “like a normal, happy family.”
Susan Ayres sees such
comments and such an opinion of Yates as a superb mother as
72
“specularizing” her in a projection of the male ego, as an ideal
mother figure. She comments that the media circuses surrounding
postpartum psychosis infanticides tend to focus on those mothers
73
who were “unlikely candidates to kill their children” because they
are not “bad,” not underprivileged, and not “mad” other than the
74
manifestation of postpartum psychosis.
The effect such
stereotypes and preconceptions about womanhood and
motherhood have on how women suffering from postpartum
psychosis are perceived add to the complexity of how postpartum
psychosis should be treated within the legal system.
B. Feminist Theory Positions on Assimilation and Difference
Some commentators have argued that accommodating
postpartum psychosis as a legitimate defense that should merit
“special treatment” recognizes the difference between men and

S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 683, 685 (1999).
68. Ayres, supra note 59, at 58-59.
69. Perlin, supra note 27, at 11. See also SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 58, at 3.
70. Ayres, supra note 59, at 72 (citing Michelle Oberman, Understanding
Infanticide in Context: Mothers Who Kill, 1870-1930 and Today, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 707, 714 (2002)).
71. Id. at 105.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 106.
74. Id. at 106-07.
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women in far-reaching and detrimental ways. Focusing on these
differences allows the legal resolution of “matters of great
importance and complexity by the simplistic, reflexive assertion
75
that women and men are ‘simply not similarly situated.’” Patricia
Pearson suggests that focusing on special treatment for women
76
ultimately will result in diminished rights for women. She notes
that postpartum psychosis was used as a nineteenth-century
77
rationale for denying women the vote.
Other commentators have suggested that such an approach
would threaten to treat women in general as “less than fully
78
competent legal citizens.”
Commentator Anne Coughlin, for
instance, argues that creating a difference in treatment of men and
women can deny women the “same capacity for self-governance
79
that is attributed to men.” “The experience of the responsible
actor is one that resonates powerfully in our culture and, by
securing an excuse, women assure that it is one that will continue
80
to be denied to them,” she claims. Dorothy Roberts argues that a
defense based on a mental disorder experienced only by women
81
“risk[s] misdiagnosing the causes of some women’s crimes.”
Further, Deborah Denno points out that using a “gender-based
standard for punishment or defenses would most likely incorporate
82
gender difference[s] in the prevalence or prediction of crime,”
creating a system of profiling that would work to the detriment of
women by “perpetuat[ing] sexism and negative stereotypes of
83
women.”
In part, these arguments reflect concerns about medicalizing
women’s negative experiences within an oppressive social system.

75. Connell, supra note 40, at 166 (quoting Wendy W. Williams, The Equality
Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151,
164 (1992)).
76. Id. at 167 (citing PATRICIA PEARSON, WHEN SHE WAS BAD: VIOLENT WOMEN
AND THE MYTH OF INNOCENCE 91 (Viking Penguin 1997)).
77. Id.
78. Oberman, supra note 62, at 66.
79. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994), cited in
Oberman, supra note 62, at 66 n.199.
80. Id. at 25, cited in Oberman, supra note 62, at 66 n.199.
81. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Gender Equality in Criminal Law, 85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1994).
82. Manchester, supra note 31, at 748-49 (quoting Deborah W. Denno,
Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 123
(1994)).
83. Id. at 749; Roberts, supra note 81, at 2.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/9

10

March: The Conflicted Treatment of Postpartum Psychosis under Criminal L
7MARCH_PAGINATED.DOC

2005]

11/17/2005 9:55:01 AM

POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS

253

Roberts argues that women should not need to claim insanity
simply because “the law does not recognize the stifling social
84
conditions that contributed to their criminal acts.” Within this
“stifling” legal system, a postpartum psychosis defense claim
“reflects society’s reluctance to address women’s problems unless
85
they are explained as illnesses.”
These arguments for an assimilative approach would not
permit a different treatment of women suffering from postpartum
psychosis than that of any other defendant suffering from a
psychotic disorder.
They argue an assimilative approach is
necessary, in order to avoid implicating gender difference as a
rationale for creating other legally recognized differences to the
detriment of women, to avoid a presumption of insanity or mental
instability among women who recently have gone through
childbirth, and to avoid characterizing social problems and
inequities as mental or medical problems and thereby evading the
need to improve social structures for women.
The problem with such an approach is that it assumes a level
playing field between the genders when, in fact, the present system
is not level at all. “If the current standard by which women are
being judged is resulting in injustice,” one commentator argues,
“then correcting that standard does not mean that women are
treated more leniently than men. It means that they are treated
86
equally.” The purpose of gender sameness assumes an element of
absurdity when the center of controversy is a mental disorder that
someone can experience only when she has given birth—
something out of the realm of possibility for men. So when the
media covering the Yates case talked of her psychosis as
87
“transcend[ing] gender,” one commentator notes, “to argue that
the Yates case ‘transcends gender’ is to miss the basic point that
Andrea Yates’ defense depends upon a female-specific psychiatric
88
condition.”
In addition, one area in which the law specifically
acknowledges a difference between men and women is precisely in
the pregnancy arena. Women who are pregnant or who have

84. Roberts, supra note 81, at 11.
85. Id.
86. Connell, supra note 40, at 167.
87. Id. at 153 (quoting Sally Satel, The Newest Feminine Icon—A Killer Mom,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at A26).
88. Id.
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recently given birth are given “special treatment” that, in actuality,
levels the playing field by placing their employment situation on a
par with that of men through the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
89
1978, for instance.
The Act states that “women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
90
treated the same for all employment-related purposes.” It is the
recognition and specific treatment of the difference between the
genders that allows for the sameness of the result. From this
perspective, recognizing a related difference in postpartum
psychosis—also affecting women who recently have experienced
the childbirth process—is not a significant carve-out in gender
difference. In addition, there is no “slippery slope” because the
women who could come within this legal carve-out constitute a very
small pool bounded by very specific criteria.
IV. POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS AND ITS PRESENT RELATIONSHIP TO THE
INSANITY DEFENSE
Societal and legal treatment of infanticide in general changes
like “a roller coaster—moving from a lenient-to-moderate period to
91
a severe period, then changing to a very lenient period . . . .” In
recent years, however, juries have shown less leniency than earlier
92
in the century.
The majority of states employ a cognitive test for determining
whether or not someone is legally insane as a defense against a
criminal charge. About half of the states employ the M’Naghten
test, which requires a showing that, at the time of the criminal
offense, the mental disease or disorder in question prevented the
defendant from knowing the nature or quality of her act, or
93
knowing the wrongfulness of her act. About half of the states use
the American Law Institute (ALI) test, by which the defendant is
considered insane if, at the time of the offense, as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacked substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality/wrongfulness of his conduct or to

89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
90. Id. § 2000e(k).
91. Norman J. Finkel et. al., Commonsense Judgments of Infanticide: Murder,
Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous?, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1113, 1115
(2000).
92. Ayres, supra note 59, at 72.
93. RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF
DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN 2 (1981).
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conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Although
the use of “appreciate” as opposed to “know” appears to lower the
bar somewhat from an “all or nothing” approach to cognition, it
still creates a gap between the manifestation of postpartum
psychosis and the requirements of the cognitive test.
A key problem is that postpartum psychosis may significantly
impair a woman’s mental stability while still not rising to the level
of an irresistible impulse—thereby not meeting a volitional test,
should it apply—and still not meeting the cognitive test required
under most states to qualify as an insanity defense. Nearly all
postpartum psychosis sufferers understand the moral wrongness of
95
killing their child(ren). At the same time, “[t]here seldom is any
real doubt as to the mental instability of mothers who kill their
children while suffering from postpartum psychosis or profound
96
postpartum depression.”
John Hinckley Jr.’s attempted assassination of President
Ronald Reagan and his subsequent acquittal by reason of insanity
led many states to adopt a narrow understanding of the insanity
defense. For instance, Idaho, which previously followed the ALI
rule, eliminated the insanity defense altogether after Hinckley’s
97
acquittal.
As a result of such narrow interpretations of the
insanity defense, “[m]ore likely than not, women suffering from
postpartum mental illness will not be sick enough to have their
98
crimes or mistakes excused . . . .”
Texas law, for instance, recognizes only a narrow definition of
99
the insanity defense. The prosecutor needs to establish only that
100
the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong.
This became easy for the prosecutor to establish in the Yates case
because she herself called the police after drowning her children to
101
report the act.
Four of the jurors in the case who were later
interviewed noted that Yates’ confession indicated that she was

94. Id.
95. Oberman, supra note 62, at 38.
96. Id. at 47.
97. Jessie Manchester, Comment, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the
Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 713, 746 (2003); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2005).
98. Oberman, supra note 62, at 63.
99. Reanta Salecl, The Real of Crime: Psychoanalysis and Infanticide, 24 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2467, 2467 (2003).
100. Id.
101. Spinelli, supra note 9, at 174-75.
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“thinking pretty clearly” and “didn’t sound psychotic,” that she
103
planned to kill the children the night before, and that her call to
police after she had drowned them showed “she knew exactly what
she was doing . . . [a]nd she knew it was wrong, or she would not
104
have called the police.”
The fact that psychiatrists called as
expert witnesses for both the defense and the prosecution agreed
that she suffered from severe psychosis was inconsequential under
105
Texas law.
The overarching problem is that the law offers a relatively
binary approach to insanity and its role within criminal law. One is
either “sane or insane, competent or incompetent, or able-bodied
or disabled” under the present legal system, one commentator
106
notes.
As a result, the system “simply fails to accommodate the
vast majority of women who struggle with postpartum mental
107
illness.”
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF SITUATING
POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS WITHIN CRIMINAL LAW
A. Maintaining the Existing System
One solution is to say that no “solution” at all is necessary
because there is no real “problem.” Postpartum psychosis is simply
one of a variety of psychotic disorders and should not be treated in
a way that differs from other disorders that could allow a defendant
to raise an insanity defense. Such an approach would also fall in
line with the assimilation feminist view by not highlighting gender
108
The problem with this approach is that it does not
difference.
recognize the unique nature of postpartum psychosis as a disorder
that affects only women, and only women who have just had a
child.

102. Lisa Teachey, Jurors Say they Believed Yates Knew Right from Wrong, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 18, 2002, at 1A.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Salecl, supra note 99, at 2467.
106. Oberman, supra note 62, at 33.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 63 n.189.
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B. Statutory Resolution—Automatic Presumption of Insanity
England, Canada, Australia, and some other European
countries have statutes that acknowledge the potential effects of
postpartum depression and psychosis on new mothers. The
Australian Infanticide Act of 1938, for instance, addresses the
109
The English
killing of children under one year of age.
Infanticide Act of 1938 allows the jury to reduce the sentence of a
woman who kills her child under a year old from murder to
110
111
manslaughter, and generally results in probation.
The statute
states:
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the
death of her child being a child under the age of twelve
months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance
of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child
or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon
the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the
circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence
would have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of
felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such offence be
dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the
112
offence of manslaughter of the child.
In Sweden, these sorts of cases go before a panel of medical
113
doctors rather than enter the criminal justice system at all.
Such an approach recognizes that postpartum psychosis afflicts
only women and that these women, while not “insane” in the
traditional sense of the term, have a severe mental condition that,
at the very least, reduces their culpability in the criminal act of
killing their infant children. Yet some commentators have noted
that because the English statute requires no causality between the
mental disorder and the killing of the child, “it practically
constitutes a per se defense to any killing that occurs within one

109. Bernadette McSherry, The Return of the Raging Hormones Theory:
Premenstrual Syndrome, Postpartum Disorders and Criminal Responsibility, 15 SYDNEY L.
REV. 292, 304 (1993).
110. Kimberly Waldron, Postpartum Psychosis as an Insanity Defense, 21 RUTGERS
L.J. 669, 679 (1990). For a relatively complete list of countries that recognize the
killing of a child soon after birth as a less culpable category of homicide, see
Oberman, supra note 62, at 45 n.76.
111. Oberman, supra note 62, at 45.
112. Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.).
113. Oberman, supra note 62, at 45.
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114

year of birth.”
This disconnect between the disorder and the
crime is problematic because postpartum psychosis is only one of a
number of different reasons researchers have found for why new
115
mothers kill their infant children. Another problem with such an
approach is that it assumes that all women after childbirth are, to
116
some extent, insane and not fully culpable for their actions. Such
a perspective could open doors to extending this perspective to
117
or to impacting
other arenas, as per Pearson’s argument,
perceptions about the mental inferiority or fragility of women as
compared to that of men.
C. Creating a New Test for Postpartum Psychosis
Some commentators have suggested creating a new insanity
test to apply exclusively to postpartum psychosis.
One
commentator has proposed the following standard, which is a
118
modified version of the Irresistible Impulse Test:
1. Affirmative defense: The defendant can raise the
affirmative defense of insanity based on postpartum
psychosis if:
a.) the killing of the defendant’s child occurred
within one year of the mother giving birth to that
child or another child, and
b.) an expert psychiatrist appointed by the court
determines that there is a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant’s sanity.
2. Elements: The defendant must prove, to the extent
determined by state law, that:
a.) she was suffering from postpartum psychosis, and
b.) there was a causal connection between the
psychosis and the killing, and
c.) she did not know right from wrong, or, if she did

114. Connell, supra note 40, at 164; see also Waldron, supra note 110, at 679
(explaining that the Infanticide Act allowed a woman to be guilty of infanticide
rather than first degree murder without establishing that the disorder was severe
enough to affect her self-control or responsibility).
115. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 7, at 36-38; Oberman, supra note 62, at 36.
116. Debora K. Dimino, Postpartum Depression: A Defense for Mothers Who Kill
Their Infants, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 257 (1990).
117. See supra Part III.B.
118. Connell, supra note 40, at 162-63.
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know right from wrong, then she must prove that
because of the psychosis, she had lost the ability to
119
choose between right and wrong.
This test has a few advantages over the present system and over
120
Like the
the statutes such as England’s Infanticide Act.
Infanticide Act, it has a temporal requirement that fits the
parameters of the onset of postpartum psychosis–no more than one
121
year after the birth of a child. It also applies only to the killing of
the defendant’s child. Unlike the Infanticide Act, however, the
proposed test requires a causal connection between postpartum
psychosis and the killing of the child. This addresses much of the
objection to those statutes.
Such a test would have the advantage of recognizing (i) the
effects postpartum psychosis have on women and their actions, and
(ii) the failure of the cognitive test to capture the disorder. It
would not offer a per se assumption of insanity, as statutes like
England’s Infanticide Act do, but it would bridge the gap between
the present requirements of the cognitive test and the effects of
postpartum psychosis.
One issue is that having this test emphasizes the differences
between women and men and the treatment of psychiatric
disorders affecting them. This treatment elicits the arguments
some feminist scholars have made against emphasizing differences
and thereby raises the possibility of other disparate gender
treatment.
Another issue with this sort of new test for postpartum
psychosis is that it opens the door for creating disorder-by-disorder
tests rather than an “insanity defense” test. Such an approach may
not, in fact, be a “problem” per se. Such an approach would bring
the legal treatment of mental illnesses and disorders more in line
with the mental health system’s treatment and presumably would
eliminate the binary legal system in place now. The problem with
such an approach is that it creates a case-by-case basis for
determining criminal culpability instead of a bright-line rule that
would generate more conformity across cases. In addition, given
the public’s suspicion of the insanity defense in general and the
worry that each disorder would receive individualized treatment

119.
120.
121.

Id.
See supra Part V.B.
Connell, supra note 40, at 163.
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that likely would not create uniformity across cases, it is unlikely
that such an approach would be feasible.
D. Offering Alternative Sentencing Options
1. Containment Within the Criminal System, but Lighter Sentencing
Some courts and prosecutors have not accepted postpartum
psychosis or depression as a complete insanity defense to murder,
but they have used it as a key mitigating factor in the sentencing
phase to acknowledge the unique and temporary nature of the
122
In 2002, for instance, a Virginia woman pled
mental disorder.
guilty to involuntary manslaughter as a result of her postpartum
psychosis, and her five-year sentence was suspended in recognition
123
of the unique and temporary nature of her condition.
By and large, this sort of approach requires an
acknowledgment of postpartum psychosis as creating diminished
capacity, rather than as a fully exonerating defense. It reduces the
level of criminal responsibility, recognizing that recidivism is not
likely to be a problem, but it still accomplishes the goal of
retributivism. It can result in a lesser prison sentence rather than a
longer commitment in a mental institution should an insanity
124
defense be successful. In effect, it is what Stephen Morse sees as a
punishment meted out in proportion to what is deserved, rather
125
than a fixed and absolute punishment for a specific criminal act.
2.

Mental Treatment Instead of Serving Time in Prison

Another solution is to shift postpartum psychosis to treatment
within the mental health system rather than incarceration within
the criminal system. This is what a “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI)
verdict functionally prescribes. At the time of sentencing, the court
would determine whether or not the defendant needs mental
treatment.
It could recommend probation with mandatory
treatment, or it could eschew probation in favor of

122. Dimino, supra note 116, at 244.
123. Oberman, supra note 62, at 42 n.64 (citing Maria Glod, No Prison Term in
Man’s Slaying; Fairfax Wife Had Postpartum Psychosis, WASH. POST, July 26, 2002, at
B7).
124. Liu, supra note 64, at 375.
125. Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 149394 (1984) (book review).
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institutionalization at a mental treatment facility. The defendant
would serve the time of the sentence either in the treatment facility
or, when treatment becomes unnecessary, in prison.
Such an approach might better serve postpartum psychosis
defendants because it emphasizes the treatment of the disorder
rather than incarceration. The problem is that postpartum
psychosis affects new mothers for only a relatively brief period of
127
time after the birth of a child. Generally, by the time a defendant
has come to trial and been sentenced, the psychotic flare-up has
128
passed and the defendant is no longer even in a treatment phase.
As a result, should such a defendant receive a GBMI verdict that
carries a treatment phase followed by the rest of the sentence spent
incarcerated, she would be shuttled directly to incarceration,
making the end result not much different than simply being found
guilty without a mental illness assessment.
Placement in a treatment facility in general poses some
challenges in the postpartum psychosis context. On average,
defendants “sentenced to mental facilities serve longer sentences in
mental hospitals than do those who are found guilty and sentenced
129
to prison.”
These longer terms pose an interesting problem for
defendants with postpartum psychosis. On the one hand, women
who suffer from postpartum psychosis invariably are charged with
either killing or attempting to kill their child. As a result, they are
subject to longer prison terms, if not the death penalty, should they
be convicted. These consequences are greater than for many of
the felony or misdemeanor charges and associated penalties that
other defendants who raise the insanity defense face. As a result, a
longer period in a mental hospital might be preferable as opposed
to the serious prison sentence should a murder charge stick.
On the other hand, these women “pose a challenge” because
postpartum psychosis is a relatively short-term disorder that is not a
130
chronic condition. Women suffer from it only after the birth of a
child, and when treated they experience a complete recovery after
131
a short period of time.
The psychosis does not recur until and
unless they give birth to another child. In this aspect, it is very

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Liu, supra note 64, at 394.
Oberman, supra note 62, at 43.
Reece, supra note 49, at 751.
Oberman, supra note 62, at 43.
Id.
Id.
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unlike most other psychoses because an additional episode is
entirely predictable and linked to a specific physiological event,
and the psychosis is “timed-out” in a sense. Although the Yates case
points to the dangers of not recognizing and treating the disorder,
proper treatment at the first onset of the mental disorder
effectively prevents future dangerousness and eliminates
recidivism. Also, society at large is not placed at risk by a woman
with postpartum psychosis, because it generally affects only the
woman involved and her child or children, and only after she has
132
recently given birth.
As a result, the dangerousness that justifies
long-term incarceration in a mental hospital or in a prison is
absent.
3.

A Hybrid Approach

The special conditions that surround postpartum psychosis
suggest a combination of requiring lighter sentencing provisions
and a treatment program might best accomplish the goals of
rehabilitation and retributivism without allowing postpartum
defendants to fall through gaps in the system. Lighter sentencing
upon a showing that the defendant was suffering from postpartum
psychosis, that the disorder caused her to kill her child(ren), but
that she cannot make out a full insanity defense to meet the
cognitive test, provides social retribution for wrongdoing but
recognizes that control over that wrongdoing was not entirely in
the hands of the defendant due to the disorder.
The key difference between such a sentencing provision and
statutes such as England’s Infanticide Act is requiring a causal link
between the disorder and the offense. In addition, putting such a
defendant in a treatment facility rather than incarcerating her in
prison during the time of her sentence recognizes her disorder
rather than punishing her for events that, but for the disorder,
would not have occurred. The causal link requirement also helps
counter the assimilative argument against different standards for
men and women in the criminal law context because it does not
presume that women should be treated differently, but that
defendants who have postpartum psychosis should be treated
differently.
This combination of lighter sentencing and treatment facility

132.

Reece, supra note 49, at 751.
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institutionalization is not a perfect solution. The fact that women
who have suffered from postpartum psychosis generally are
improved, if not fully restored, by the time their case reaches a
sentencing phase makes the treatment facility institutionalization
seem a bit superfluous. Yet, if such guidelines were followed, then
the entire process would move more quickly, women could plead
into this system, and they could receive the treatment needed for
an appropriate time period.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the complex web of issues surrounding postpartum
psychosis, including the basis for the disorder, the gender
implications it carries, the problems that exist in conforming it to
legal standards for insanity, and people’s suspicions about
temporarily morbid psychotic disorders, it is unlikely that a perfect
solution exists for the legal treatment of the disorder. But the
system as it exists now has failed for women such as Andrea Yates,
who everyone—jurists, the prosecutor, and the public alike—
agreed was suffering from a mental instability due to postpartum
psychosis at the time she killed her children. A new system that
creates some sort of carve-out for women suffering from
postpartum psychosis creates no slippery slope of retributionist
exclusion that would extend to a wide pool of criminal offenders.
An acceptable solution is one that recognizes the unique nature of
postpartum psychosis and resolves, at least in part, the problem of
balancing treatment and punishment. A hybrid of reduced
sentencing and treatment over incarceration moves in this
direction.
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